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The energy sector faces many challenges today, in particular from the current health
(COVID-19) and resulting financial crises. However, a significant number of
challenges existed prior to the outbreak of COVID-19. The approach here is to
align academic and practitioner legal research and illuminate for the business world
from a legal perspective what the key commercial risks are for the energy sector in
the years ahead. A further aim of this article is to demonstrate to interdisciplinary
energy researchers how these commercial risks can influence energy activity and
decision-making across the world at local, national and international levels. Often
those in science or social science do not realise the vital role law plays in reducing
or increasing the risk profile of energy activity. And that, in essence, is what this
article aims to address: the knowledge gap around law and risk and how
interdisciplinary scholars should understand the issue of commercial risk in the
energy sector. This article identifies how commercial risk for the energy sector will
change due to what can be classed as ‘justice risks’. Resolving these justice risks
will be necessary over the lifetime of a project from planning through construction,
operation and decommissioning phases. For all stakeholders in the energy sector it
is vital that there is a recovery and that new energy projects are built and that they
contribute to a country’s 2030 energy and climate goals. As the world faces the
ongoing challenges of the COVID-19, financial and energy-climate crises, ensuring
engagement with justice risks can provide a pathway forward to ensure investors
commit to investment. Energy, a key sector in the global economy, will be affected
but at the same time can enable economic recovery. It can be stated, therefore, that
energy has a dual nature – rather like the health sector – being part of the problem
but also the solution to the current financial crises (ie the panacea).
Keywords: commercial risk; justice risks; COVID-19; energy transition; financial
crisis
1. Introduction
One of the key trends in energy law over the last few decades has been its promotion of
incentives for new energy infrastructure.1 The world always needs new energy
1 RJ Heffron and K Talus, ‘The Evolution of Energy Law and Energy Jurisprudence: Insights for Energy
Analysts and Researchers’ (2016) 19 Energy Research and Social Science 1.
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infrastructure for multiple reasons – for example, to further economic growth, to
increase energy access, to reduce energy poverty, to replace aged infrastructure and
to meet carbon dioxide reduction policies. This remains the case today and it will
only increase after the present COVID-19 virus and resulting financial crisis.
Indeed, new energy investment will be seen as the catalyst to restart many econom-
ies across the world. The figure advanced by Bloomberg (2019) on new energy gen-
eration investment by 2050 is $13.3 trillion, and it is likely that the world will
accelerate towards that figure much faster than planned due to the need to emerge
from this current crisis. Also, a further $11.4 trillion will be put towards distribution
and transmission,2 and a range of reports state that ca $40–50 trillion will be invested
in the energy sector more broadly, which includes expenditure in extractives, waste
management, electricity grids and upgrading existing infrastructure.
It is within this context that this article addresses this new scenario of increased
energy investment activity and the issue of risk for this investment. The term ‘commer-
cial risk’ is used to express this investment risk. There is a need to explore this issue of
risk from a legal perspective, as it is the job of the lawyer to enable the project devel-
oper, investors and/or other capital providers to manage, as much as possible, the com-
mercial as well as the political risk. This is in order to make the project financially
viable and for them to make a reasonable return on their investment; it should be
noted that it is not true in all cases that a project needs to make a return on investment
to be built, and this will be discussed later.
It is important to realise in the debate that energy law is itself changing due to the
energy transition and the resulting move to a low-carbon economy. There is now an
emerging set of energy law principles that are aiming to guide developments in the
energy sector from a legal perspective.3 The unique contribution made here is the
identification of new ‘justice’ risks alongside general commercial risks of project
development. Many commercial risks can be and are already quantified into project
development costs and hence will or may be part of the borrowing cost, of the insur-
ance, etc. However, new risks are emerging from society and the planned push for a
more inclusive, just and equitable society, and these ‘justice’ risks will rise and
increase in importance into the future. These risks will impact those in the legal pro-
fession, who will have to identify them for their clients, while researchers will have to
explore these ‘justice risks’ in more depth. And, in this context, there has been work by
practitioners and academics on energy law and justice produced very recently by the
International Bar Association;4 this article builds on this new area in the literature
which has been growing significantly since 2013.5
2 Bloomberg, ‘New Energy Outlook Annual Report Executive Summary 2019’ (2019) https://bnef.turtl.
co/story/neo2019/page/2/2?teaser=true accessed 1 July 2020.
3 RJ Heffron and others, ‘A Treatise for Energy Law’ (2018) 11(1) Journal of World Energy Law &
Business 34.
4 I Del Guayo and others (eds), Energy Justice and Law (Oxford University Press 2020).
5 RJ Heffron and D McCauley, ‘The Concept of Energy Justice Across the Disciplines’ (2017) 105
Energy Policy 658; RJ Heffron, D McCauley and BK Sovacool, ‘Resolving Society’s Energy Tri-
lemma Through the Energy Justice Metric’ (2015) 87 Energy Policy 168; D McCauley and others,
‘Advancing Energy Justice: The Triumvirate of Tenets’ (2013) 32(3) International Energy Law
Review 107; RJ Heffron and D McCauley, ‘Achieving Sustainable Supply Chains Through Energy
Justice’ (2014) 123 Applied Energy 435; K Jenkins and others, ‘Energy Justice: A Conceptual
Review’ (2016) 11 Energy Research and Social Science 174; D McCauley and others, ‘Energy
2 R Heffron et al.
The viability of energy projects and the legal processes that need to be followed
and addressed are vital in terms of whether a project happens or not. A project can
fail for many reasons, and indeed in the project management research literature,
‘law’ is identified as a key reason why projects fail.6 In addition, there have been
cases where completed projects have been partly built or even completed but never
turned on due to legal issues that have not been resolved. All of these issues within
law are what can be classed as commercial risk.
The impact of these commercial risks is very important for interdisciplinary energy
scholars to realise, as often these risks are underappreciated by them in energy project
development.
At this time, when the world is experiencing the COVID-19 health crisis and as a
result is in the midst of an associated financial crisis, understanding risk is even more
vital. This has traditionally been the area of lawyers and financiers; however, there is a
need for more engagement on risk in energy by all stakeholders and scholars in the
energy sector. This article contributes broadly to interdisciplinary research on the
energy sector, and its novel contribution is to set out a new category of risk, ie
justice risks, within commercial risks of an energy infrastructure project.
This article explores in brief what commercial risk is (in Section 2) and then ident-
ifies some of the key risks that will be realised post COVID-19 (in Section 3).
However, it is proposed here that many of these risks can be placed in a new category
of risk, and identified as ‘justice risks’. These justice risks have been on the rise since
the last financial crisis of 2007–2009, and as a result of COVID-19 they will accelerate
even further in their influence and will have to be fully incorporated into research and
practice around energy project development. Section 4 presents these justice risks in
more detail; Section 5, the conclusion, highlights some of the issues of importance
in the context of these justice risks as the world faces the triple challenge of events
from the health, the financial and the energy transition.
2. Commercial risk – a definition
There are many definitions of commercial risk, and these may vary according to a
company’s business sector. However, a broad and clear definition is one that states
commercial risk covers all risk except political risk, with political risk commonly
understood as expropriation, adverse government action (including change in law or
tax regime), and political or civil disturbance.7 In terms of finance, at some point
many state that commercial risk concerns repayment of finance, but again a broader
understanding can be that commercial risk questions the viability of a project or
activity. The different risks occur generally across four stages of a project and its
associated activities, from planning to development to operation to the
Justice in the Transition to Low Carbon Energy Systems: Exploring Key Themes in Interdisciplinary
Research’ (2019) 233–234 Applied Energy 916; B Sovacool and others, ‘Energy Decisions Reframed
as Justice and Ethical Concerns’ (2016) Nature Energy doi:10.1038/nenergy.2016.24.
6 B Flyvbjerg, ‘Managing Major Projects’ in PWGMorris, JK Pinto and J. Soderlund (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of Project Management (Oxford University Press 2011).
7 OECD (2020). Commercial risks over the project life cycle. https://rmid-oecd.asean.org/project-risks-
mitigation/project-risks/commercial-risks/commercial-risks-over-the-project-life-cycle accessed 20
December 2020.
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decommissioning stage. However, from the past it is clear that the decommissioning
phase has not always been considered.8 These risks are expressed in Figure 1.
In the context of the energy sector and this article, commercial risk refers to energy
projects in whichever stage they are at. It is proposed here that a definition of commer-
cial risk has been lacking and that this is why there is a need for a concept of justice
risk to be incorporated; this will ensure, for example, that the previously ignored issue
of decommissioning is accounted for. However, of greater importance is that the
justice risks provide a more holistic perspective of managing risk across the lifetime
of a project, rather than the focus on commercial risk in the past, having been con-
nected to planning and construction.
New energy infrastructure has more demands placed on it today. For example, cur-
rently new energy infrastructure is needed to further economic growth, to increase
energy access, to replace aged infrastructure and to meet carbon dioxide reduction pol-
icies. The key purpose of energy law across the world currently concerns the develop-
ment of new energy infrastructure. And legal theory highlights the different drivers of
energy law (or evolution of energy law) and how we are in a phase where infrastruc-
ture and justice are the key drivers of the formulation of energy law, as opposed to
issues such as economics, security and safety.9
The risk in energy project development continues across the project life cycle.
There are key stages such as environmental impact assessments (EIA); the social
licence to operate (SLO) which operates across the full project life cycle; and the
energy finance research obligation (EFRO).
Figure 1. Project risk across the project development in the energy sector.
Source: created by the author (RJ Heffron, 2020). Key: EIA – environmental impact assessment;
SLO – social licence to operate; and EFRO – energy finance reserve obligation.
8 RJ Heffron, ‘Energy Law for Decommissioning in the Energy Sector in the 21st Century’ (2018) 11(3)
Journal of World Energy Law & Business 189.
9 Heffron and Talus (n 1).
4 R Heffron et al.
In terms of general commercial risks, all of these will typically be addressed as the
subject matter of private-law contracts, and the essence of good risk management is to
ensure the risk is contracted for, ie the risk is allocated among stakeholders relevant to
the project. Who is a stakeholder is increasingly a very broad question that needs
addressing, but in brief it includes public actors and all types of private actors that
may be part of or affected by the project. And stakeholders can be populations
across the world, as was highlighted in a recent Australian case – Gloucester
Resources Limited v Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7. In this case, Judge
Brian Preston considered stakeholders beyond the Australian border when deciding
to not grant permission for a coal mine, ie people overseas would be affected by
carbon dioxide emissions from coal; this is a form of cosmopolitan justice that is
becoming part of legal decision-making.
For the interdisciplinary energy scholar, it is important to consider that many issues
can arise that increase the risk to a project (whether it is being planned, constructed, in
operation or decommissioned). In this article, the aim is to detail a new range of issues
across the energy sector that are currently increasing the commercial risks in the
sector; these risks – justice risks – are identified in the next section.
3. The rise of ‘justice risks’
As legal theory suggests in the evolution of energy law, the issue of ‘justice’ has
become an emerging key driver of energy law formulation.10 It is becoming influential
alongside infrastructure, as was highlighted in the previous section. In terms of
business, there has been a focus around risks in terms of energy activities and, more
specifically, energy project development. The combined issue of justice and risks as
applied to energy project development has been underexplored, and also underappre-
ciated in terms of commercial progress of energy projects, by the interdisciplinary
energy community.
Irrespective of COVID-19 and the new 2020 financial crisis, the energy transition
has been underway, and that is clear both from energy research and practitioner litera-
ture. However, what has been evolving is the role for justice in that transition and how
it will be achieved.11 With greater justice, there will be a reduction in commercial risk.
Generally, the search for justice is driven by a need to rebalance a relationship that has
become unbalanced.12 That is why governments, companies, and individuals enter into
contracts. It is also why one goes to court, to ensure compensation or behavioural
change as a result of an imbalanced relationship. In this context, what is in essence
at stake is that an individual’s or group’s rights are being infringed. If you can
prove that, you can achieve change.
At its simplest, justice in the energy sector means the application of human rights
across the energy life cycle (ie from extraction to production, operation, supply,
10 Ibid.
11 RJ Heffron and D McCauley, ‘What Is the “Just Transition”?’ (2018) 88 Geoforum 74–77; D McCau-
ley and RJ Heffron, ‘Just Transition: Integrating Climate, Energy and Environmental Justice’ (2018)
119 Energy Policy 1.
12 This premise is from Heffron OIES – RJ Heffron, ‘Justice in the Energy Transition. Special Issue:
‘Decarbonisation Pathways for Oil and Gas’ (2020) March (121) The Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies.
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consumption and waste management).13 When these rights are infringed, there is a call
for justice. Such a right may already be enshrined in legislation, or society may be of
the view that it should be and that public policy needs to change (and, following that,
new legislation will reinforce that policy). An individual or group may then test
whether the change has happened or will happen in the courts, such as is happening
in the energy and climate change cases discussed later in this article.
At the core of these calls for more justice in the transition are five forms of justice,
which are detailed below in brief (this article does not seek to go into depth on energy
justice, as this has been achieved by the literature)14:
. Distributive justice focuses on burdens, risks, costs and benefits;
. Procedural justice assesses government and public decision-making and
processes;
. Restorative justice aims to rectify or ameliorate existing harms or injustices;
. Recognition justice aims to ensure that all social groups participate in decision-
making; and
. Cosmopolitan justice focuses on the impact of actions taken in one country on
people in other countries.
The aim here is to explore the recent phenomena that have arisen in terms of justice,
and what is referred to here as justice risks. These are risks that emanate from a greater
societal call for justice that is permeating how economies are run across the world. This
can be seen across the interdisciplinary energy journals which have had special issues on
‘justice’, such as Nature Energy (2016), Energy Policy (2017) and Applied Energy
(2018). In addition, there has been a notable and significant rise in the influential econ-
omics literature in terms of justice issues. Economics since the 2007–2009 financial
crisis has started to engage with this issue in a significant way (one can follow the
work of leading economists such as Joseph Stiglitz (2012), Thomas Piketty (2015),
Walter Scheidel (2017) and Anthony Atkinson (2015)).15 Indeed, Thomas Piketty, in
his recent book Capital and Ideology (2020, 670), decries the issue and states that
despite living in a world of big data, public data on inequality is inadequate. Piketty
(2020) notes the key issue of inequality and climate change emissions, and from this per-
spective he highlights how this will cost economies (and more likely developing ones)
5–20 per cent of lobal gross domestic product (GDP), if not more (he cites the Stern
Review (2007) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2018)
report), demonstrating that these effects may be accelerated as a result of pollution
and environmental damage since 2007.16
13 Heffron and McCauley (n 5).
14 Ibid.
15 T Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (A Goldhammer tr, Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press 2014); J Tirole, Economics for the Common Good (Princeton University Press 2017); W
Scheidel, The Great Leveler (Princeton University Press 2017); JE Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality
(Penguin Books 2012); AB Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Harvard University Press
2015).
16 T Piketty, Capital and Ideology (A Goldhammer tr, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020);
IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global warming of 1.5°C.; Stern, N. H., & Great Britain.
(2007). The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
6 R Heffron et al.
Justice risks are the risks that result from society seeking more fairness, inclusive-
ness and equitable solutions, and resolving inequality in a variety of ways. In essence,
they aim to address a normative situation – the way society wants the world to be – to
provide a future pathway for societal development. Not all are legislated for directly or
in one place currently today, but together they demonstrate that they are now having a
key influence on the way business is developing.
Conditions in society have been changing for multiple reasons, but the increase in
data, the increased availability of technology, the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the
COVID-19 pandemic and now the 2020 financial crisis have created what can be
referred to as a ‘perfect storm of energy justice’17 whereby the opportunity for
justice to permeate the energy sector has arisen; as Plato stated, ‘Accidents and
Figure 2. Justice risks in project development (planning, construction, operation and decommis-
sioning).
Source: created by the author (RJ Heffron, 2020).
17 Heffron (n 12); www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/OEF121.pdf accessed 20
December 2020.
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calamities… are the universal legislators of the world’.18 In this context it is proposed
that there is a new class of risks to energy activities and project development, and these
are justice risks. Twelve justice risks are identified in Figure 2; these have their roots in
the five forms of justice as mentioned earlier, but have been created by advances in
societal conditions; and they apply across the lifetime of a given project (ie from plan-
ning to construction to operation to decommissioning).
4. Justice risks
In this section, each of the justice risks identified in Section 3 is detailed in turn. The dis-
cussion of these risks is not meant to be exhaustive; its purpose is rather to open the scho-
larship and practitioner debate on the subject and to identify the core issues for each of
these justice risks. Figure 2 highlights that these justice risks are global, ie they are impact-
ing on project development all over the world. Figure 2 also highlights that these justice
risks apply across the project life cycle from planning to construction to operation to
decommissioning. Finally, these justice risks, when resolved, address core justices
issues such as procedural, distributive, restorative, recognition and cosmopolitan justice.
4.1. Economic justice – addressing inequality and government support
After the economic crisis of 2007–2009, a revision of economic thinking occurred.
The education of economists across many countries has changed, and universities
that once relied heavily on neoclassical economics are now accommodating more
and broader economic perspectives. There has been an increased focus on inequality,
for example in Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century,19 and Jean
Tirole, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, stated in essence, in his book in Economics
for the Common Good,20 that justice (via law) has a key role to play in ensuring that
society can address the issues of the energy and climate crisis.
Changes to laws and government policy have increasingly begun to address issues
of inequality across all parts of our societies, including the energy sector. A govern-
ment can enhance the economic standing of a particular beneficiary or group of ben-
eficiaries to achieve a particular purpose – for example, a policy of granting subsidies
to owners of renewable energy assets in order to incentivise investment in such assets,
thereby accelerating the growth of such low-carbon power generation and reducing
carbon emissions. It is a form of procedural justice.
It has been argued that the role of government in transitioning to a sustainable
economy includes: (1) funding for science-based research; (2) using fiscal policy to
mobilise private capital into low-carbon investments; (3) public investment in sustain-
able infrastructure; (4) regulating behaviours to limit damage to and destruction of
ecosystems; (5) partnering with the private sector; (6) measuring and monitoring pro-
gress towards sustainability targets; and (7) transferring sustainable technologies to
developing countries.21
18 Plato, The Laws (TJ Saunders tr, Penguin, 1970), 164.
19 See eg Piketty (n 15).
20 Tirole (n 15).
21 Steven Cohen, ‘The Role of Government in the Transition to a Sustainable Economy’ Huffpost (12
April 2014).
8 R Heffron et al.
Fundamentally, however, the energy transition is a matter of energy policy. Broad-
based policy support is the premise of all other forms of government support. And with
197 countries having adopted the Paris Agreement – see Section 4.10 – that broad pol-
itical support appears to exist in abundance.
But bold, ambitious commitments alone are just sentiment without being sup-
plemented by more detailed policies and measures to support the achievement of
the commitments. A report from the World Economic Forum and Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) called not just for ambitious policy goals but for ‘a meaningful price
on greenhouse gas emissions, but also sector-specific regulations and incentives pro-
moting remedies such as a switch from fossil fuels to renewable energies, electric
mobility, efficiency, green building standards – supported by accelerated
innovation’.22
While the Paris Agreement is a grand exercise of multilateralism in some
senses, it ultimately requires individual countries to pursue their own carbon
reduction programmes to achieve the collective goal. What has been done and
what still needs to be done can only be analysed on an individual country basis.
For example, in the UK, transition to a lower carbon economy has been government
policy for more than 20 years. The Climate Change Act 2008 imposed legally
binding targets for greenhouse gas reduction – initially set at an 80 per cent
reduction (against 1990 levels) by 2050. In 2019, the UK government pledged
the country would become net zero by 2050, and that pledge was enshrined into
law by increasing – to 100 per cent – the greenhouse gas reduction targets in the
Climate Chance Act.23 In furtherance of the targets the UK government has intro-
duced ‘sector specific regulations and incentives’, but to date these have been
mostly focussed on a transition from fossil fuel-based power generation to low-
carbon forms of power generation.
The UK has had success in a transition to low-carbon power generation – notably
the massive expansion of offshore wind and a steep decline in coal-fired power gen-
eration24 – but a sizeable portion of the UK’s power generation still comes from una-
bated carbon-emitting sources.25 And in any case, a total reduction in carbon
emissions from power generation alone is not enough to achieve this. Other sectors
including transport, heating of buildings and certain industries are major carbon emit-
ters and have to play a role. In 2017 the UK government published its Clean Growth
Strategy, which set out a range of support initiatives in key areas including green
finance; business and industrial energy efficiency; domestic energy efficiency; heat;
transport; smart, flexible power; natural resources; and the public sector. The nature
of support for each initiative varies, ranging from funding for research to public invest-
ment in infrastructure, subsidy schemes and regulation aimed at changing consumer
22 World Economic Forum & BCG, The Net-Zero Challenge: Fast-Forward to Decisive Climate Action
(Insight Report) (WEF 2020).
23 Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019 (SI 2019/1056).
24 The current UK government’s plan is to shut down all coal stations by 2025.
25 In the third quarter of 2019 in Great Britain, 28.2 TW/h of electricity was generated through
gas-fired generation, and 7.2 TW/h was generated through bio-energy. See OFGEM (2020).
Electricity generation mix by quarter and fuel source (GB). www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/
electricity-generation-mix-quarter-and-fuel-source-gb accessed 20 December 2020.
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choices.26 The governments of some other countries have gone even further to support
the energy transition.
However, not all countries have gone as far. The US famously expressed its inten-
tion to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. And the commitments of other major
emitters including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia have been criticised as insufficient
to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement.27 What is interesting is that many of
the countries deemed to have made insufficient carbon reduction commitments are
also countries perceived to have lower standards of access to justice, whereas many
of the countries deemed to have made sufficient carbon reduction commitments are
also countries perceived to have higher standards of access to justice.
In 2018 the United Nations (UN) secretary general called climate change ‘the most
systemic threat to humankind’. And here in 2020, the world faces an altogether differ-
ent systemic threat to humankind. Some fear that the political momentum behind the
energy transition will be lost in the fight against COVID-19 and that carbon reduction
measures will be deemed unnecessary expenses as recessions bite. But if global threats
to humanity – be they pandemics, war, famine or indeed climate change – have one
common thread, it is that they are solved through government action. The current
COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying economic crisis is an opportunity for govern-
ment stimulus packages to be applied towards the research, the sustainable infrastruc-
ture and the subsidy initiatives needed to support the energy transition. As former US
President Barack Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emanuel famously said, ‘You never
want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to
do things that you think you could not do before’.28
4.2. Taxation
Since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, society has started to reassess the role of taxation.
The use of tax havens is now well documented, and there have been major leaks that have
promoted change (the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers).29 As a result, more scru-
tiny is now being paid to international transactions, particularly because energy companies
were exposed as heavy users of tax havens. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) is aiming, through several initiatives, to examine the issues
(particularly inequality) whereby the unfair world of international taxation30 is causing
injustice in the energy sector (and especially in the mining sector31).
26 For example, see the UK Government material: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/700496/clean-growth-strategy-correction-april-2018.
pdf accessed 20 December 2020.
27 See profiles and analysis of countries’ commitments at https://climateactiontracker.org/ accessed 20
December 2020.
28 R Emanuel, ‘Let’s Make Sure This Crisis Doesn’t Go to Waste’ The Washington Post (25 March 2020)
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/25/lets-make-sure-this-crisis-doesnt-go-waste/ accessed 20
December 2020.
29 See both of the following: B Obermayer and F Obermaier, The Panama Papers (OneWorld Publi-
cations 2016); N Shaxson, Treasure Island (Penguin, Random House 2016 – original edition 2011).
30 RJ Heffron and J Sheehan, ‘Rethinking International Taxation and Energy Policy Post COVID-19 and
the Financial Crisis for Developing Countries’ (2020) 38(4) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources
Law 465.
31 RJ Heffron, ‘The Application of Distributive Justice to Energy Taxation Utilising Sovereign Wealth
Funds’ (2018) 122 Energy Policy 649; RJ Heffron, The Role of Justice in Developing Critical
10 R Heffron et al.
Nevertheless, a fundamental problem with taxation has to do with how it is
reported and manipulated in accounting practice and reporting, and that the direc-
tion of this relationship between tax and financial reporting is unclear. What is
evident is that current tax systems across the world are deemed unfair, and
reform is needed.32 In this era of multiple calls for increased transparency there
will be significant hazards ahead for tax and auditing firms such as the Big
Four.33 Additional obligations to justify decision-making and positions in tax
and financial reporting are among the best solutions for the future, alongside
increased transparency. Steps forward to correct an imbalanced system will have
to be slow, and then in time considerations such as global taxes, as proposed by
Piketty, might be realistic options.34
The emergence of COVID-19 has resulted in general turbulence in political and
economic activity, and this creates change and uncertainty in the tax system. There-
fore, there is an ongoing battle to ensure the tax system achieves its objectives. And
this is mirrored by the increased interest in accounting information by other stake-
holders – witness the increased interest by environmental, energy and climate
change non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in accounting information regarding
the energy companies’ accounts.35 Taxation is an area that will increase in importance
in the future, and the focus will begin to broaden and be far more comprehensive than
just on the aforementioned area of disclosure and transparency (and on the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative). Moreover, how tax is reported, how much is paid,
how it is earned and how potential tax revenue is managed will be key issues of
concern – ie distributive justice will be of vital importance. Indeed, society overall
will look at how to restore justice within national and international tax systems and
how to correct the violations of human rights that occur due to the unjust international
tax systems.36
4.3. Project finance
Project finance has been described as ‘the most widespread financial technique that
financial markets have developed for the participation of private capital in unlisted
infrastructure…’.37 In and of itself, however, project finance is climate agnostic –
it is best suited simply to whichever projects ensure and secure stable revenues over
the long term. In essence there is a matter here of distributive justice by nature.
Minerals (2020) The Extractives Industry and Society, 7 (3), 855–863; and ID Qurbani, RJ Heffron,
and ATS Rifano, ‘Justice and Critical Mineral Development in Indonesia and Across ASEAN.’
(2021). The Extractives Industry and Society, Advance Access https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2020.
11.017.
32 (1) EB Kapstein, Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field (Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2006); (2) MJ Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns (Yale University Press 2008).
33 S Kells and ID Gow, The Big Four: The Curious Past and Perilous Future of the Global Accounting
Monopoly (La Trobe University Press 2018).
34 Piketty (n 15).
35 Bloomberg (Chasan, E), The Next Phase in Sustainability Disclosure Is Coming (12 October 2017)
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-12/the-next-phase-in-sustainability-disclosure-is-coming-
q-a accessed 20 December 2020.
36 Heffron and Sheehan (n 30).
37 Raffaele Della Croce and Stefano Gatti, ‘Financing Infrastructure – International Trends’ 2014(1)
OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends.
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Therefore, one of the core objectives of energy transition policy that seeks to uphold
distributive justice must be to ensure that all forms of finance – including project
finance – are directed towards low-carbon sustainable energy projects and away
from other energy projects.38
The adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Confer-
ence of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(COP 21) Paris Agreement have increased attention on the role of finance in the tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy. The focus, however, has hitherto been concentrated
on the investment decisions of institutional investors.
Since the first notable issuances by the World Bank in 2008, demand driven by
institutional investors’ ever-growing focus on environmental, social and governance
(ESG) criteria has seen the green bond market grow to over $250 billion annually.39
In the absence of regulation, the market responded with the emergence of voluntary
standards, such as the Green Bond Principles and the Climate Bond Standards,
against which issuers can have their issuances accredited by independent environ-
mental rating agencies. Policymakers are now catching up; the EU has proposed a
regulation on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment.40
The purpose of the regulation is to create a taxonomy (ie classification criteria) for sus-
tainable investments to encourage the movement of capital towards more sustainable
investments. Once in force, the regulation will apply to financial market participants
offering financial products as environmentally sustainable investments (eg asset man-
agers and pension funds) and will be supplemented by other regulations, including one
imposing new disclosure and transparency requirements around the integration of ESG
criteria into investment decisions.41
But whilst green bonds are undoubtedly providing a major source of funding for a
transition to a low-carbon economy, in most cases they are not a source of project
finance in the true sense. Most green bonds are treasury bonds issued against the
balance sheet of large financial institutions, governments and corporations.42 For the
development of individual energy projects, loans – from both commercial lenders and
development finance institutions – remain the dominant source of debt finance.
And the loan market now seems set to follow the trajectory of the bond market in
the green finance space. A power transmission project in Uruguay, sponsored by
Italian energy company Terna and financed by the Inter-American Development
Bank and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), claims to have closed the first
limited-recourse project financing based on ‘green loans’, in 2017. The loans for
that project were accredited against the Green Bond Principles. However, the Green
Loan Principles were subsequently created under the auspices of the Loan Market
38 For example, the stated UK government policy recognises the need for ‘specific actions to mobilise
and accelerate flows of private finance into key clean growth and environmental sectors at home
and abroad’. See HM Government, Green Finance Strategy: Transforming Financing for a Greener
Future, July 2019, 9.
39 See, for example www.climatebonds.net accessed 20 December 2020.
40 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Establishment of a Framework to Facilitate Sustainable Investment (24 May 2018).
41 Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on
sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector.
42 See, for example www.climatebonds.net/cbi/pub/data/bonds accessed 20 December 2020.
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Association, to establish a framework for green loan financing.43 The core tenet of the
Green Loan Principles is that the proceeds of the loan must be used for a ‘Green
Project’.44 In practice this means that an assessment of the risks, costs, and benefits
to the environment – and therefore society as a whole – form part of the lending cri-
teria. In the absence of a justice-based approach, a bank, in forming its lending criteria,
would have no logical reason to assess risks, costs or benefits other than those to which
it, as the lender, is directly exposed to (eg bankrupcty of the borrower).
Much like the Green Bond Principles, the Green Loan Principles are voluntary.
Nevertheless, the development of law, policy and market practice for green bonds
suggests that increased disclosure obligations on banks and financial institutions
around environmental sustainability and climate risk are expected, creating an incen-
tive for financial institutions to hold loans that have been independently accredited as
‘green’. If the green bond market is anything to go by, a rapid expansion in green loan
financing should be expected and this could play a vital role in ensuring the just energy
transition.
4.4. Bankruptcy
Financial underperformance is on the rise in the energy sector with the ongoing energy
transition.45 Many would argue that it has been an issue in energy companies, which
have tried to avoid environmental responsibilities.46 Bankruptcy in the energy sector is
on the rise. In January 2019, California’s largest electric utility, Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E), filed for bankruptcy, claiming liabilities of over $51 billion.47 The utility
argued that its financial position had destabilised due to a heavy debt load as well
as wildfire-related liabilities. California regulators, however, argued that the utility’s
debt problem was of its own making. PG&E did not maintain an adequate and resilient
infrastructure, which resulted in devastating wildfires in 2018 alone.
The wildfires were responsible for the complete destruction of several California
towns and villages, and destroying over 19,000 homes. Damages have been estimated
to exceed $30 billion, and the utility entered into a $13.5 million settlement with wildfire
victims.48 On top of the civil liabilities, the utility also pled guilty to 84 criminal charges
of involuntary manslaughter that resulted in the maximum fine of $4 million.49 However,
although PG&E is an investor-owned utility, the climate costs from these events will fall
on state and local governments, ratepayers, and taxpayers more generally. The costs are
not limited to privately owned utilities.
43 See eg www.lma.eu.com/application/files/9115/4452/5458/741_LM_Green_Loan_Principles_
Booklet_V8.pdf accessed 20 December 2020.
44 The Green Loan Principles do not prescribe detailed eligibility criteria in themselves. But they do
contain a schedule of indicative Green Projects (eg renewable energy, energy efficiency).
45 See the dramatic fall in General Electric, the US company charted in the following book: T Gryta and
T Mann, Lights Out: Pride, Delusion and the Fall of General Electric (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
2020).
46 See Heffron (n 8).
47 Sammy Roth, ‘PG&E Files for Bankruptcy Protection’ Los Angeles Times (29 January 2019).
48 JD Morris, ‘Fire Victims Seek Assurances on PG&E’s $13.5 Billion Bankruptcy Deal’ San Francisco
Chronicle (6 April 2020).
49 George Avalos, ‘PG&E Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges in Fatal 2018 Camp Fire in Butte County’
The Mercury News (23 March 2020).
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This disaster has been termed the first climate change bankruptcy in the world.
The human loss is incalculable. Unfortunately, the PG&E bankruptcy is only one
dramatic data point regarding the future costs of climate change that will affect
all utilities operating under the traditional central power station model. And
indeed, bankruptcy will increase as more climate change issues are considered
and increase the risk profile of new projects but also existing, operating projects.
Both international and national climate assessments indicate that future weather
events will be more extreme and more frequent. However, today’s utilities were
built at a time that did not account for present climate risks or for future climate
volatility. Although utilities regularly complain about regulatory costs associated
with carbon emissions reductions, such compliance costs pale in comparison to
the other financial risks ahead.
Risks to utilities are significant. Severe weather will cause more flooding and
more wildfires, which, in turn, will cause more outages. Outages will lower effi-
ciency, raise expenses and increase costs to consumers. Further, as noted by the
PG&E example, failure to adequately protect against such events raises the real
possibility of incurring extraordinary civil and criminal penalties. Additionally, con-
tinued exposure to these liabilities will lower a utility’s valuation and, as a conse-
quence, raise its cost of capital.
Future climate-related costs to utilities involve compliance, planning, infrastruc-
ture investments and investments in resilience. McKinsey and Company estimates
that the costs for US utilities to prepare against such events could be as much as $1
billion for each utility.50 The company also estimates that the cost of extreme
weather events will be roughly $1.7 billion per utility. In short, McKinsey argues
that investment in protecting against such future events is cost-effective.
There are various investment strategies that utilities can take to reduce risks and
future liabilities. As part of their internal management, environmental planning, risk
assessment and resilience planning should be mandatory. Additionally, utilities must
rethink their business models. They cannot continue to build large central power
stations, particularly those that burn fossil fuels. Additionally, investing in the
future must involve improving the grid as well as making investments in energy effi-
ciency and energy storage, and in decentralised distributed energy resources such as
micro grids.51
The PG&E bankruptcy, in and of itself, is not an indication that bankruptcy threa-
tens many utilities. Utilities will not go bankrupt overnight. The PG&E bankruptcy
does, however, provide other lessons for all utilities. If attention is not paid to
climate change, if climate change and resiliency investments are not made today,
then financial exposure in the future will only increase. The smart utility of today,
as well as the smart utility of the future, must not only make preventative investments
in its central power station operations but must design new business models that
decentralise generation as well as transmission and distribution and that increase
energy efficiency and the use of renewable resources.
50 Sarah Brody, Matt Rogers and Giulia Siccardo, Why, and How Utilities Should Start to Manage
Climate-Change Risk (April 2019).
51 Ibid; Hauke Engel, Per-Anders Enkvist and Kimberly Henderson, How Companies Can Adapt to
Climate Change (McKinsey & Co. report, July 2015).
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4.5. Disclosure and transparency
Several issues with an impact on the energy sector relate to disclosure and transparency.
While increased transparency and disclosure of payments made to foreign governments
and other similar information are in themselves positive developments, they also create
more risks for the companies active in the energy sector. International accounting standards
now require more disclosure specifically for energy projects.52 For example, the inter-
national Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) requires signatory states
and investors to disclose the details of their taxation relationship, beneficial owners of
companies and so on, with the EITI Secretariat monitoring the submissions.
There are several emerging legal instruments that countries are utilising to increase
disclosure and transparency. Many of these also create additional risk for energy com-
panies. The ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO – the relationship between energy corpor-
ations and the local community, which is becoming formalised through a contract)
requires more transparency between an energy project developer and the local commu-
nity, and some projects have been stopped recently when the terms of the licence were
not honoured, for example in high-profile cases in Colombia.53 The SLO, as shown in
Figure 1, applies over the duration of an energy project and it will be transformative in
ensuring disclosure and transparency across the project life cycle.
The ‘energy finance reserve obligation’ (EFRO), also highlighted in Figure 1,
applies at the decommissioning phase of the project life cycle; however, if present
from the outset it will affect cost calculations of a project from the first instance.
An EFRO requires, through legislative change, an operator to place money in
escrow equal to the estimated cost of decommissioning an energy asset, to ensure
that clean-up will be funded even if the operator goes bankrupt or sells the asset to
a company without the financial capacity to pay for it.54
However, themost urgent challenge in relation to disclosure and transparency that the
energy industry is increasingly subject to is the so-called ‘environmental and social gov-
ernance’ (ESG)movement and ESGdisclosures. ESGcan be defined as ‘criteria [that] are
a set of standards for a company’s operations that socially conscious investors use to
screen potential investments. Environmental criteria consider how a company performs
as a steward of nature’.55 Unlike the traditional or normal corporate disclosures, ESG dis-
closure has its focus on non-financial disclosures.56 The World Bank, while providing a
definition and definitive list of what ESG covers, states that key issues it includes are:
. E: climate change, carbon emissions, pollution, resource efficiency, biodiversity;
. S: human rights, labor standards, health & safety, diversity policies, community
relations, development of human capital (health & education); and
52 For an overview of various transparency and disclosure initiatives globally, see G Mete, ‘Transition of
Global Governance of Energy and Extractive Sectors: Proliferation of Transparency and Accountabil-
ity Initiatives’ OGEL 3 (2018) www.ogel.org.
53 RJ Heffron and others, ‘The Emergence of the “Social Licence To Operate” in the Extractive Indus-
tries?’ (2018) Resources Policy https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2018.09.012.
54 RJ Heffron, ‘The Global Future of Energy Law’ (2016) 7 International Energy Law Review 290.
55 Investopedia (2020) ESG, www.investopedia.com/terms/e/environmental-social-and-governance-esg-
criteria.asp accessed 20 December 2020.
56 Paul Brest, Ronald J Gilson and Mark A Wolfson, ‘Essay: How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create
Social Value’ (2018) 44 Journal of Corporation Law 205, at 211.
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. G: corporate governance, corruption, rule of law, institutional strength,
transparency.57
Various ESG disclosure obligations are rapidly becoming more prevalent in home
states of major energy companies. The European Union, South Africa, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, among others, have instituted specific sustain-
ability reporting regulations.58
The European Union has in many ways been the leader behind ESG disclosure
obligations. After the 2013 Directive 2013/34/EU,59 the European Union enacted
the Directive 2014/95/EU disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by
certain large undertakings and groups.60 This directive requires certain large compa-
nies to provide a non-financial statement containing information to the extent necess-
ary for an understanding of the undertaking’s development, performance, position and
impact of its activity, relating to, at minimum, environmental, social and employee
matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.
The US, home to many major energy companies, has not been overly active in the
area. Other than the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2010 guidance
on climate change disclosures, which tracks the traditional ‘materiality’ standards
for disclosure to date, the SEC has never mandated or provided specific guidance
related to ESG, despite some who are advocating for such disclosure rules.61 The
key issue in respect is what is meant by ‘materiality’ under the SEC; Rule 10b-5
states that it is illegal to ‘make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading…’.62 The question
in this respect is whether specific guidance is needed given the universal nature of
the ‘materiality’ standard that applies to any and all disclosure considerations, no
matter what the topic. Are the risks related to ESG disclosure different than any
other disclosure risk? Does the non-financial nature of ESG disclosure change
things in this respect?
Disclosure obligations and perhaps the lack of clear and workable rules have also
resulted in litigation around ESG disclosures. One example of this is the recent case
against ExxonMobil. The New York state attorney general’s office’s investigations,
based on the New York anti-fraud law ‘Martin Act’, against ExxonMobil led to a
case against the company. The key claim was that ExxonMobil misled investors by
fraudulently employing two sets of books to calculate profits and losses on investments
57 World Bank (G Inderst and F Stewart), Incorporating Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)
Factors Into Fixed Income Investment (World Bank Group 2018).
58 Jerry KC Koh and Victoria Leong, ‘The Rise of the Sustainability Reporting Megatrend: A Corporate
Governance Perspective’ (2017) 18 Business Law International 233, 237.
59 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual
financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertak-
ings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing
Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, pp 19–76).
60 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large
undertakings and groups (OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, pp 1–9).
61 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).
62 Ibid. Emphasis added by authors.
16 R Heffron et al.
and the risks it faced as governments act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.63 The
New York Supreme Court found for ExxonMobil, stating that the New York AG
failed to establish that any investor was misled. It is noteworthy that the AG did not
prove its case under the Martin Act which has no scienter requirement to prove
fraud (unlike federal securities laws). The AG also chose not to appeal the case.
Regardless of the outcome, these type of cases are on the increase and highlight the
ESG risks the energy industry is facing today.
One of the difficulties energy companies face under the ESG disclosure obligations
are the unclear boundaries for shareholder resolutions that seek to limit the business
judgement of directors. Many such proposed resolutions are disguised as seeking
only disclosure of good/bad ESG behaviour, yet their clear purpose and hoped-for
effect is to limit the business choices available to a company and its directors. For
US companies, the SEC imposed some boundaries in its 2010 communication. The
boundaries, if any, for companies organised under the laws of EU nations and in
other jurisdictions are less clear.
A corollary or subsidiary issue relating to shareholder resolutions is the enforce-
ment risks and potential outcomes if (1) a company’s shareholders pass an aggressive
ESG ‘disclosure’ resolution and (2) the activist shareholders behind it, who were
expecting materially changed business outcomes, think that the outcomes and/or dis-
closures do not meet the spirit (ie their expectations) of the resolution.
So far, the success of attempts by activist shareholders to win proxy resolutions have
been mixed at best. However, at ExxonMobil’s 2017 annual shareholder meeting, both
Blackrock and Vanguard, together controlling approximately $12 trillion in assets,
voted to require ExxonMobil to produce a report regarding climate change.64 Similarly,
Blackrock sided with Occidental shareholders, supporting their proposals because ‘it
was concerned about Occidental Petroleum’s pace of disclosure to date’.65
One of the key legal issue on the horizon is a corporation’s state law fiduciary
duties and Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) duties to maximise
its shareholders’ and employees’ value versus ESG considerations, which might be
in direct tension with value maximisation.
4.6. Insurance
After a crisis, insurance is also more difficult to obtain. And in light of changes in the
commercial world alongside climate change issues, insurance for energy projects has
now become very difficult to obtain. In 2019, coal projects found it very difficult to get
insurance.66 This will have a knock-on effect where there will be a rise in cases where
63 Natalie Nowiski, ‘Rising Above the Storm: Climate Risk Disclosure and Its Current and Future Rel-
evance to the Energy Sector’ (2018) 39(1) Energy Law Journal 27.
64 Eric Rosenbaum, ‘Activists Thought BlackRock, Vanguard Found Religion on Climate Change. Not
Anymore’ CNBC (13 October 2019) www.cnbc.com/2019/10/13/blackrock-vanguard-found-religion-
on-climate-doubts-are-growing.html accessed 20 December 2020.
65 Ross Kerber, ‘BlackRock Switch Helps Pass “Historic” Climate Measure at Occidental’ Reuters (12
May 2017) www.reuters.com/article/us-blackrock-occidental-climate/blackrock-switch-helps-pass-
his-toric-climate-measure-at-occidental-idUSKBN1882AA accessed 20 December 2020.
66 M Sheehan, ‘Coal Exclusions Double in 2019 as Action Spreads Beyond Europe’ Reinsurance News
(2 December 2019) www.reinsurancene.ws/coal-exclusions-double-in-2019-as-action-spreads-
beyond-europe/ accessed 20 December 2020.
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the insurer of last resort – the state – will need to become much more active, and as a
result, the public will increasingly question all the benefits of fossil fuel development
and its continuation.
A key area here in terms of insurance is the future risk. Already investors are
nervous, as emphasised by a recent letter written by a large and significant group of
investors to the US Federal Reserve System, outlining the risks posed by climate
change, the need for immediate action and how the financial regulator has a lead
role to play.67 Indeed, it has long been recognised that action should have been
taken earlier in terms of risk and climate change;68 however, no company would
deem it satisfying to increase costs, and moreover, it has to be a premium that all com-
panies are prepared to pay. There are, however, signs of change.
The global insurance industry, as stated, is beginning to increase the price of insur-
ance for coal projects. Part of the challenge globally is the over-reliance on and technol-
ogy lock-in to conventional energy sources. And there is a new challenge as well in more
affordable low-carbon energy that also meets national energy and climate goals. There is
a need for investment decisions to move towards a more long-term focus, and this is
expressed as a key issue by the actuarial profession in terms of managing risk regarding
climate change.69 In a similar way, a leading McKinsey report highlights that the lack of
diversification in energy strategies by many companies and countries is a problem, and
that these stakeholders need to realise opportunities from decarbonization, which are less
risky,70 and in part due to current or anticipated future lack of availability of insurance.
Insurance risk is a justice risk that is fast emerging. It takes into account several of
the other justice risks and will result in increased application of justice in energy
decision-making. The capture of risk data is highlighting the exposure of conventional
energy sources to climate risk that results in increasing insurance costs and, therefore,
increasing borrowing costs. This is in part why early in 2020, the BlackRock Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer stated, in his annual address to shareholders, that there
will be a major reallocation of capital towards sustainable investments that will be
driven by climate risk – and this is an important statement by a firm that manages
nearly $7 trillion in assets.71 And indeed, it is also significant in this context that
BP would later write off £17.5 billion in assets from their balance sheet.72
67 Ceres, Letter to the US Federal Reserve System (21 July 2020) www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/
Federal%20Regulators%20Letter.pdf accessed 20 December 2020.
68 M Tucker, ‘Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: The Cost of Increased Risk and the Impetus
for Action’ (1997) 22(2) Ecological Economics 85.
69 Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, Climate Change: Managing Risk and Uncertainty: Policy Briefing
(2015). www.actuaries.org.uk/system/files/field/document/Climate%20Change%20Managing%
20Risk%20and%20Uncertainty%20-%20Policy%20Brief.pdf accessed 20 December 2020.
70 McKinsey Global Institute, Climate Risk and Response: Physical Hazards and Socioeconomic
Impacts (16 January 2020) www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/
climate-risk-and-response-physical-hazards-and-socioeconomic-impacts# accessed 20 December
2020.
71 Marketwatch, (R Koning Beal) ‘BlackRock’s Fink Pressed to Take Action over Words in Dumping
Fossil Fuels’ (15 January 2020) www.marketwatch.com/story/blackrocks-fink-pressed-for-action-
over-words-in-dumping-fossil-fuels-2020-01-14?mod=article_inline accessed 20 December 2020.
72 ‘BP to Take up to $17.5bn Hit on Assets after Cutting Energy Price Outlook’ Financial Times (15 June
2020) www.ft.com/content/2d84fc23-f38d-498f-9065-598f47e1ea09 accessed 20 December 2020.
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4.7. Environmental impact assessments
The environmental impact assessment (EIA) has been around since the 1980s, but only
now has it really begun to assist in developing a low-carbon economy. A procedure
that is required before an energy project can be permitted, it assesses the project’s
environmental and social impacts in detail from an interdisciplinary perspective.
This paper does not aim to go into particular depth on EIAs,73 but it does intend to
focus on how EIAs are impacting energy project development and creating risk for
those projects.
As Figure 1 shows, EIAs come into play at the outset in the project life cycle, at the
planning phase, and impact on the project risk immediately – hence their importance.
In essence, the EIA process concerns procedural justice at three levels – international,
national and local:
. ‘International: in securing finance for the project this will require an EIA to be
produced for the financing institution under international banking standards –
the Equator principles (this may be different for a company who will finance
the project in-house or a national company who avails of financing options
within the country but the likelihood is there would remain some environmental
impact statement produced);
. National: Has to adhere to national EIA legislation and submit an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) which has to be approved before the project receives
permission to start; and
. Local: The EIA process has to include several elements of public participation
and involve these local stakeholders in the plans for the development of the
project’.74
There also is an additional justice perspective, from a global point of view, where
the EIA process has to be seen as a success as it has in essence promoted the philoso-
phical ideal that people are all world citizens – ie cosmopolitan justice.75 This will be
discussed further in the context of two cases in 2019, in Australia and Kenya.
The EIA process has placed certain limitations on development and ensured that
development that does occur is achieved with environmental protection as a core
aim from the beginning of the process. The legislation on EIAs has been changing
periodically at national and international levels since it was introduced, and in
73 The literature on EIAs is extensive from a legal and also an interdisciplinary perspective. There is
research written on all aspects of the EIA process, and more can be found in the journal Environmental
Impact Assessment Review. EIAs are the cause of many legal cases each year all over the world. Avery
comprehensive book on the subject matter is Environmental Impact Assessment by Tromans, although
it has a UK focus; and it contains a very good approach from an EU law perspective: S Tromans,
Environmental Impact Assessment (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Professional Ltd 2012).
74 RJ Heffron, ‘The Role of Justice in Developing Critical Minerals’ (2020) 7(3) The Extractives Industry
and Society 855.
75 Cosmopolitan philosophy is the belief that we are all ‘world citizens’. Cosmopolitanism has existed in
some form since the ancient Greeks. The first philosopher in the West to give a perfectly explicit
expression of cosmopolitanism was the Socratically-inspired Cynic Diogenes in the fourth century
BC – it is said that when asked where he came from, he replied ‘I am a citizen of the world’ (Diogenes
Laertius VI 63): Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013 (Revised), ‘Cosmopolitanism’ http://
plato.stanford.edu accessed 20 December 2020.
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particular over the last decade, such that there are now further obligations to (1)
demonstrate a more independent process; (2) gather and utilise more data; (3)
examine the cumulative impacts of the project (with existing projects in the same
area); and (4) show consideration of alternatives (alternative projects). The EIA
process has become more strict in application at the national level, and also at the inter-
national level, for example where international banking rules (known as the Equator
Principles) now make the EIA a prerequisite for project financing. Further, year-on-
year the amount of data required in EIAs is increasing, with more data collection on
the socio-economic impacts of an energy project (such as will be highlighted below
in relation to the case law). Initiatives like the Equator Principles, while not nationally
enforced, are creating a momentum shift due to the international banks connecting
non-compliance with these principles as a project with greater risk; therefore, they
are no longer willing to support such projects. In this context what is deemed inter-
national ‘soft’ law in effect becomes ‘hard’ law.
It should be noted that there is additional support for EIA legislation at the inter-
national level, through an international agreement called the Aarhus Convention 1998
– known as the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. This agreement
allows for public participation in energy projects, and public access to environmental
data, and is an agreement signed by 39 countries but with 47 parties to it. The result is
that there is added enforcement to national EIA legislation, but this was a convention
advanced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) so is
limited mostly to the EU and neighbouring countries.
Two recent cases on EIAs demonstrate the new risk associated with the EIA, and
its vital role in project development. The interesting issue here too is that one example
is from the developed world and one from the developing world, which highlights that
the EIA is bringing in change. The EIA demonstrates that the collection and utilisation
of data are now changing the nature of what energy projects can be built by virtue of a
failure by certain projects to make it through the EIA process; and this is expected to
rise. Recent decision-making in the legal courts after EIAs were challenged, in particu-
lar in Australia and Kenya, demonstrated that the data on socio-economic benefits and
other costings have proved inadequate and/or over-/under-estimated. Groups opposed
to particular energy projects are increasingly able to obtain data that challenges that of
the project developer.
In 2019, two coal projects were stopped, one in Australia and one in Kenya,
because their EIAs were considered unsatisfactory. The key reasons for the failure
were that the EIAs lacked completeness in terms of data provision, the poor assess-
ment of the social and environmental impacts from the existing data, and that the pro-
jects’ positive economic contributions were overestimated.76 The amount of data that
must be presented in the EIA process is growing, and the link between EIAs, data and
76 B Nogrady, ‘Landmark Australian Ruling Rejects Coal Mine Over Global Warming’ Nature (11 Feb-
ruary 2019) www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00545-8 accessed 20 December 2020; D Herbling,
‘Kenya Cancels Environment License of $2 Billion Coal-Power Plant’ Bloomberg (26 June 2019)
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/kenya-cancels-environment-license-of-2-billion-
coal-power-plant accessed 20 December 2020.
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justice has already been identified.77 These latter two cases and others highlight the
rise of data, and data that is accessible, and they demonstrate how recent changes in
EIA legislation around the world have risen to prominence and are again increasing
the risk profile of energy projects.
4.8. Climate change action
Climate change has often been described as ‘the challenge of our generation’, with
broad international consensus on the need to limit global temperature increases to
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels to reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.
Indeed, 189 of the 197 signatories to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change
have now ratified the treaty.78
Climate change litigation is increasingly being used as a tool to recover ‘the costs
of climate-related damage and adaptation, but also as a means to promote and accel-
erate policy change and the transition towards a lower global carbon economy’79 –
and this cost recovery can be described as an element of restorative justice. As of 12
April 2020, 1538 climate change litigation cases in at least 36 different countries had
been reported globally. The vast majority of these cases (1188) were brought in the
United States, with growing jurisprudence in other highly developed countries,
including Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.80 Cases have also
been brought in the International Court of Justice, within the European Union
courts, before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and before numer-
ous UN committees. A more recent development has been the trend towards cases
being brought in developing countries, including India, Pakistan, Uganda, Colombia
and the Philippines.81
Governments are most commonly sued in non-US cases, with the case law
showing that decisions relating to environmental assessment of projects and permitting
of developments, greenhouse gas reductions and trading and human rights are most
likely to be challenged in the courts. For example, in Urgenda Foundation v. State
of the Netherlands,82 the Urgenda Foundation successfully used a combination of
tort law and international law to argue that the Dutch government had breached its
duty of care to the Dutch people, under Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, in failing to take sufficient actions to mitigate and prevent climate
77 K Sherren and others, ‘Digital Archives, Big Data and Image-Based Culturomics for Social Impact
Assessment: Opportunities and Challenges’ (2017) 67 Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 23.
78 Environmental Defenders Office NSW, ‘Climate-Ready Planning Laws for NSW Rocky Hill and
Beyond’ (EDO NSW, 2019) 3.
79 Mark Clarke and Katherine Daley, ‘Climate Change Litigation Is Driving the Transition’ (Petroleum
Economist, 27 January 2020) www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/low-carbon-energy/energy-
transition/2020/climate-change-litigation-is-driving-the-transition accessed 20 December 2020.
80 Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, ‘US Climate Change Litigation’ (Climate Case Chart) http://
climatecasechart.com/us-climate-change-litigation/?cn-reloaded=1 accessed 20 December 2020.
81 Joana Setzer and Rebecca Byrnes, ‘Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation: 2019 Snapshot’ (Gran-
thamResearch Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and the Centre for Climate Change Econ-
omics and Policy, July 2019) www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GRI_Global-
trends-in-climate-change-litigation-2019-snapshot-2.pdf accessed 20 December 2020.
82 [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689. See also RJ Heffron, ‘State of the Netherlands v Urgenda (Case Note)’
(2020) 1(1) Global Energy Law & Sustainability 104.
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change.83 This decision was upheld in Court of Appeal of the Hague, with the court
finding that the Dutch government was required to adopt stricter emissions reductions
targets, reducing emissions by at least 25 per cent on 1990 levels by 2020.84
The case law in the United States highlights a much more diverse approach to
climate change litigation. Most of these claims are founded upon a breach of
federal or state legislation, or the constitution. However, there is also growing jurispru-
dence emerging that relies on common law tort claims, and novel arguments, such as
the public trust doctrine, which ‘assigns the state responsibility for the integrity of a
nation’s public trust resources for future generations’.85
Almost 20 per cent of the cases in the United States, and 1 in 7 cases elsewhere, are
directly connected to projects and decisions in the energy sector.86 This figure seems
low given that ca 77 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions are either directly or
indirectly linked to energy use. Not surprisingly, the cases that are brought often target
the most carbon-intensive energy projects – particularly coal, gas and oil projects.
An increasing number of climate change cases are being brought in the energy
sector against private corporations seeking to (i) hold them responsible for climate
change damage resulting from their projects; (ii) force them to incorporate climate
risk into their investment decisions; and (iii) disclose climate risks to their share-
holders.87 It is this kind of climate change litigation that can expose justice risks by
shifting away from a narrow, purely project-level focus to legal interventions that
hold corporations directly to account for the climate consequences of their actions
through novel forms of litigation.88
Governments, private corporations and investors must consider the climate
impacts of projects in their decision-making during both the due diligence phase
and the environmental assessment and approvals process. Once approved, proactive
steps need to be taken to mitigate or prevent climate damage, and the exposure of com-
panies to climate risks should be disclosed to shareholders. While this will not render a
company free from climate litigation, a lack of disclosure will likely increase the
potential for litigation risk.89 Importantly, many of these risks need to be assessed
on a cumulative basis, meaning that the importance of climate change litigation will
only continue to grow in the coming years.
4.9. Rules of foreign investment
Until relatively recently, the function and role of international energy arbitration was
relatively unknown to interdisciplinary scholars and to the general public. This was
83 Setzer and Byrnes (n 81).
84 Andrew Corbel, ‘A New Era of Climate Change Litigation in Australia?’ (Corrs Chambers Westgarth,
8 April 2019) https://corrs.com.au/insights/a-new-era-of-climate-change-litigation-in-australia
accessed 20 December 2020.
85 United Nations Environment Programme, ‘The Status of Climate Change Litigation’ (UNEP, May
2017) https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/20767/climate-change-litigation.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y accessed 20 December 2020.
86 Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (n 3). Calculations are the author’s own.
87 Setzer and Byrnes (n 81) 8–9.
88 Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky and Anita Foerster, ‘Shaping the ‘Next Generation’ of Climate Change
Litigation in Australia’ [2017] MelbULawRw 39.
89 Setzer and Byrnes (n 81) 9.
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true both for investment arbitration between the foreign investor and the host state
where the energy investment takes place and for commercial arbitration between
private companies. Today the situation is somewhat different, especially for the first
area, investment arbitration.
Recent cases in countries like Bolivia, Kenya, and Peru highlight key legal issues
such as the importance of EIAs, social licences to operate, and energy finance reserve
obligations, as well as energy justice issues. An ongoing case in Nigeria between the
Nigerian government and a foreign investor, with an award worth approximately $9.6
billion at stake, will be transformative on several issues.90 The first question is whether
foreign investments should receive full protection, and the second question then arises
whether an energy arbitration case should be subject to advances in public policymak-
ing. The answer should be a resounding ‘yes’, especially as an energy case involves
energy, environmental, and climate change issues and generally also includes
closely related issues such as international development, finance, and taxation. The
UK High Court stated in August 2019 that there was no public policy issue.
One of the areas where the tension is already mounting, and will probably continue
to do so over the next few years, is the wave of national bans against coal-based power
generation in Europe. The German company Uniper has indicated its readiness to
initiate a case against the Dutch government’s legislative move to phase out coal-
based power generation by 2030 on the back of the Energy Charter Treaty. The case
would relate to Uniper’s coal-based generating facility in the Netherlands, which
was commissioned in 2016. The investment decision for the project was made in
2007 with cooperation from the Netherlands government at the time.91
The potential Uniper case against Netherlands is but one example of the difficult
issues raised by the ongoing energy transition. Regardless of how one wants to
view the situation (public policy and climate urgency vs investor rights), the transition
risks for energy companies are clearly illustrated through this case.
If the energy transition is to happen, rules around investor protection will have to
recognise the transition and its foreseeability. The controversial issue in this respect is
the role and responsibility of governments in soliciting certain type of investments into
their respective countries and energy mixes, and the role and responsibility of private
undertakings making the investments. This will be an area of transformation over the
next decade and will put pressure on energy projects.
4.10. The 2015 Paris agreement
On 12 December 2015, meeting in Paris under the auspices of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 195 nations signed what has been hailed as an historic
climate agreement. The United States was a signatory to the agreement under the
Obama administration, only to have that commitment reversed by the Trump
90 For background, see (1) Reuters (2020) www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-arbitration/nigerian-
court-orders-firm-that-won-9-billion-case-against-government-to-forfeit-assets-idUSKBN1W42IG
accessed 20 December 2020; and (2) RJ Heffron and R Bausch, ‘Process & Industrial Developments
Limited v The Federal Republic of Nigeria (Case Note)’ (2020) 1(1) Global Energy Law & Sustain-
ability 101.
91 See section seven in the text at www.fortum.com/about-us/blog/forenergy-blog/7-things-to-know-
about-fortums-uniper-acquisition accessed 20 December 2020.
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administration and soon to be restored under the new Biden administration. The agree-
ment was recognised as a ‘turning point, that this is the moment we finally determined
we would save our planet’ and that the assembled nations ‘share a sense of urgency
about this challenge and a growing realization that it is within our power to do some-
thing about it’.92
The signatories pledged to reduce carbon emissions with the intent of keeping
global warming below 2°C while pursuing the more ambitious target of limiting temp-
erature increases to 1.5°C from pre-industrial levels. The actual commercial costs of
implementing the Paris Agreement are difficult, if not impossible, to determine
because the issue is susceptible to political polemics. From the right, the agreement
will cost tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars to implement. From the left, the
costs will be more if the levels of carbon reduction are not achieved. Recent reports
from the IPCC consistently argue that failure to address climate change now will be
much more expensive in the future.93 Even the Trump administration’s climate
report estimates that failure to address climate change will cost the United States 10
per cent of GDP by 2100.94
Although the short (11-page) agreement does not set legally binding emissions
limits, the parties committed themselves to a regime that requires them to report on
the progress of their commitments every five years beginning in 2020 (which has
been delayed until 2021 due to COVID-19).95
The Paris Agreement advanced earlier efforts, such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in
the Copenhagen Accord of 2009. The heart of the agreement requires signatory states
to announce their ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) to emission
reductions. The NDCs are accompanied by international norms to ensure transparency
and accountability. Additionally, the NDCs are intended to encourage states to ratchet
up their commitments to reduce carbon emissions every five years.
The NDCs form the heart of the agreement. They are determined by each signatory
rather than negotiated internationally. Notably, NDCs are required of all signatories
rather than a selected and limited group of developed nations. Although not legally
binding, they are subject to publicity. They are recorded in a public registry that is
available for public dissemination, and to date over 180 states have registered their
NDCs.96
The technical, economic and political complexities of climate change meant that
the conference would not, by itself, solve climate change problems, and the agreement
92 White House, Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21 (30 November 2015) www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-first-session-cop21; Coral
Davenport, ‘Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris’ NY Times (12 December 2015)
accessed 20 December 2020.
93 IPCC, Fifth Assessment – Guide for Policymakers www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_
SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf accessed 20 December 2020.
94 US Global Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate Assessment: Volume II Impacts, Risks,
and Adaptation in the United States: Report-in-Brief (2018) https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/
downloads/NCA4_Report-in-Brief.pdf accessed 20 December 2020.
95 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/
Rev.1 (12 December 2015) http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf accessed 20
December 2020.
96 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Agreement: A New Hope?’ (2016) 110 American Journal of
International Law 288.
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was not cheered by everyone. Of most concern was the fact that even if every country’s
pledge to reduce greenhouse emissions is honoured and implemented, they would not
be sufficient to reach the climate goals set by the convention. There are, though, sig-
nificant upsides to the agreement even if it fails to solve the problems of a warming
Earth.
In addition to the widespread adoption and commitment to addressing climate
change, the agreement, importantly, contains a human rights provision. Although it
was not included as an operative article, it was included in the preamble. The
human rights language directs participants to consider their environmental obligations
regarding human rights, including the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples,
the rights of immigrant children, and the rights of other vulnerable populations.97
The conference was well attended, with over 19,000 government participants
including 150 heads of state. Additionally, there were more than 6000 representatives
of NGOs and businesses. This broad participation also generated a series of commit-
ments from public actors from all levels of government and from the private sector.
Examples from the public sector include Mission Innovation, through which devel-
oped countries pledged over $19 billion per year in public finance by the year 2020 for
clean energy research, and the Global Covenant of Mayors, which involves over
10,000 cities and local governments committed to carbon reductions.98 On the
private side, the Breakthrough Energy99 Coalition spearheaded by Bill Gates includes
companies such as BNP Paribus, General Electric, Microsoft, and the Virgin Group.
Breakthrough Energy is a coalition of investors in clean technologies and was initially
funded with over $1 billion of capital.
The Paris Agreement may not eliminate the necessary level of carbon emissions;
however, it derives its importance from the fact that it has beenwidely adopted, is perceived
as an important initiative frommultiple public and private actors, and has articulated for the
world a vision of a future with a cleaner environment and cleaner energy resources.
4.11. Rise in imagery and data
There is a rise in the use of imagery and data across the world. Both are having an
impact and increasing the risk profile of energy projects. These are also both areas
of research growth as, particularly in law, both are utilised in and are valuable
sources of evidence in legal courtrooms and prior legal proceedings.
For example, personal technology is having a big impact in terms of using imagery
to change public policy; and it should be noted that images already play a role in both
criminal and civil legal systems. The difference now, however, is that personal tech-
nology has caused images to be accessible to all and to be captured by all. That this
should spread into mainstream society in terms of the effects of climate change
should be no surprise, but it is having a major effect. Key issues around personal
97 Cinnamon Carlene and JD Colevecchio, ‘Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement &
the Future of International Climate Change Law’ (2019) 27 New York University Environmental Law
Journal 107.
98 Global Covenant of Mayors home page www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/ accessed 20 December
2020.
99 Breakthrough Energy home page www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/ accessed 20 December 2020.
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decisions on where to live, lifestyle, and tourism will change, and are already influen-
cing societal development. The literature is growing in this area alongside the realis-
ation of the effects of this imagery.100
The literature on imagery to date has concerned mainly communication and
engagement practices;101 however, it is proposed here that the role of imagery has
become more powerful. There are some who argue that in processes such as an EIA
process, images are ‘made to fit’ the reality they are intended to serve.102 But local
communities are increasingly utilising technology to hold energy companies accoun-
table, and this is changing the behaviour of the energy companies who must ensure that
what they do in one part of the world does not impact their business in another part of
the world. Local communities can share and transmit images that become available to
other local communities worldwide.
Data is also becoming more readily accessible, and this is informing and influen-
cing behaviour. For example, the use of data (already highlighted in terms of EIA pro-
jects in section 4.7) is becoming influential in courtrooms. There will be an impact,
then, on the risk profile of a project as the project developer’s data comes under
increased scrutiny. However, data can also play a powerful role in a positive way
and thus, for some projects, it will reduce the risk as it shows the benefits of such tech-
nology. For example, increasingly data is used to ensure more flexibility is utilised in
the electricity system.103 Further, data is being utilised with artificial intelligence (AI)
to capture consumer usage in terms of electricity consumption and energy storage
technology, to increase consumer efficiency and reduce personal energy intensity.
As technology grows around AI and battery storage technology, this style of data man-
agement will ensure that low-carbon energy becomes even more of a viable and com-
petitive source of energy than conventional energy.
4.12. UN sustainable development goals
The SDGs were unanimously adopted by 193 UN member states on 25 September
2015 as part of UN Resolution 70/1, ‘Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development’.104 The SDGs were designed to follow on from the Mil-
lennium Development Goals and established the post-2015 global development
agenda until 2030. They comprise 17 goals, with an associated 169 targets and 232
indicators, which are used to measure performance.
The SDGs are wide-ranging in their design, providing a clear link between sustain-
able development and the international human rights agenda. As a result, the SDGs
100 SJ O’Neill and N Smith, ‘Climate Change and Visual Imagery’ (2014) 5 WIREs Climate Change 73.
101 SJ O’Neill and others, ‘On the Use of Imagery for Climate Change Engagement’ (2013) 23(2) Global
Environmental Change 413.
102 A Roque de Oliveira and M Partidario, ‘You See What I Mean? – A Review of Visual Tools for Inclus-
ive Public Participation in EIA Decision-Making Processes’ (2020) 83 Environmental Impact Assess-
ment Review 106413.
103 R Heffron and others, ‘Industrial Demandside Flexibility: A Key Element of a Just Energy Transition
and Industrial Development’ (2020) 269(115026) Applied Energy https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.
2020.115026.
104 Nathan Lobel and others, ‘Mapping the Renewable Energy Sector to the Sustainable Development
Goals: An Atlas’ (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Equitable Origin, Business &
Human Rights Resource Centre and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, June 2019) 5.
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have been described as ‘integrated and indivisible’.105 Despite this, there has been
broad acknowledgement of the critical role that the energy transition will play in
achieving the SDGs, with SDG 7 – to ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable
and modern energy for all’ – often described as a key enabler for all of the other
SDGs.106 This reflects the interlinkages between energy and poverty eradication
(SDG 1); reduction of inequalities (SDG 10); gender equality (SDG 5); jobs (SDG
8); climate change (SDG 13); food security (SDG 2); heath (SDG 3); education
(SDG 4); clean water and sanitation (SDG 6); sustainable cities and communities
(SDG 11); innovation, transport, and industrialisation (SDG 9); peace and security
(SDG 16), refugees and other situations of displacement.107
Achieving SDG 7 means providing access to electricity for 840 million people
globally, and significant improvements to energy efficiency, and also requires that
clean cooking and heating fuels and technologies are provided to the 41 per cent of
the global population who currently lack them.108 While achieving SDG 7 is not an
insurmountable task, evidence suggests that progress is already too slow for the
2030 goals to be achieved.109 This problem is compounded when the enabler role
of SDG 7 in achieving the other SDGs is considered. To achieve SDG 7, investment
in this area needs to more than double the $US500 billion per annum currently being
spent, to $US 1.2 trillion per annum until 2030.110 Under the Addis Ababa Action
Plan, this investment will come not only from foreign aid but also from private
businesses, international trade and finance, and both public and private domestic
resources.111
The SDGs will facilitate the energy transition globally by accelerating the deploy-
ment of projects that reduce reliance on fossil fuels and help to mitigate climate
change. This has seen countries increase their investment in energy efficiency
measures, deploying more renewable energy projects and rolling out more trans-
mission and distribution infrastructure to increase access to clean and reliable
energy. For areas where grid-connected power is not possible, this is reflected in the
growth of decentralised and distributed energy resources.112 Education and
capacity-building projects that improve knowledge sharing and technology trans-
fers,113 as well as those that better engage with local communities and stakeholders,
are also being encouraged.
105 Ibid, 14.
106 United Nations, ‘Analysis of the Voluntary National Reviews Relating to Sustainable Development
Goal 7’ (United Nations, 2018) https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
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107 Lobel and others (n 104).
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A further impact of the SDGs is that they have brought human rights consider-
ations within the energy sector into much starker focus, right down to the individual
project level. This means that particularly for companies and financiers operating in
this sector, the global expectations around their conduct are rapidly changing, impact-
ing their exposure to legal and regulatory, reputational, financial, environmental and
social risks.114 In addition to companies being expected to comply with the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the International Finance Corpor-
ation (IFC) Performance Standards, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises, the International Labour Organsiation (ILO) Core Conventions, and the
Equator Principles, good corporate citizens are now expected to model the impacts
of the SDGs on their projects throughout their operational processes and supply
chains, as well as on their corporate governance decisions.115 Companies that adopt
this approach not only reduce their project risk by improving their social licence to
operate but also are more attractive to investors, financiers and host governments by
facilitating a just, equitable and inclusive framework for economic development.
This enables companies to ensure that their operations do not increase justice risks
for their host communities and the environment.116
5. Conclusion
Prior to COVID-19 and the resulting financial crisis, the world faced the challenge of the
energy transition. This latter issue had already added to and created risk in the energy
sector following the impact of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Fossil fuel projects
are associated with more risk, and recent developments have added further risk while
competition has begun to make an impact. Pre-COVID-19, low-carbon technology
was playing a significant role in terms of competing against conventional energy
sources in terms of cost. However, and in addition, low-carbon energy development
has also been a way of diversifying an energy asset portfolio, and this perspective con-
tinued once it became more cost competitive. Now with the energy transition, the motiv-
ation for which is to ensure the world does not exceed a 1.5 to 2°C temperature rise, there
is a further reason for additional low-carbon energy development. In particular, health
and the impact of carbon dioxide emissions (particularly as suffered in urban areas)
have been key drivers of the motivation to build more low-carbon energy. These
latter reasons were key reasons why so many countries (195) signed and ratified the
2015 Paris Agreement, in which countries have all made a commitment to meet
energy and climate goals for 2030. Hence, overall, through a variety of different initiat-
ives, there was major momentum for change prior to the outbreak of COVID-19.
What change COVID-19 will bring was an additional key question for this article to
consider. COVID-19 has had limited new impacts; rather, it has continued the impacts
that were happening before. COVID-19 shines a light on the materialisation of effects of
the last global financial crisis (2007–2009) and a range of other developments that have
all materialised at the same time, so as to create a ‘perfect storm’ of justice risk issues (as
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caused a financial crisis, and its effect is to accelerate the action that had already resulted
prior to COVID-19. We propose that COVID-19 has acted and is acting as an ‘acceler-
ant’ in ensuring that there is a just energy transition.
The new ‘justice risks’ categorised in this article (shown in Figure 2) move society
beyond the traditional commercial risks that the energy sector considered previously.
These justice risks are more equitable and inclusive and capture issues across the full
energy project lifespan, from planning to construction to operation to
decommissioning.
A further aim of the paper is to engage with scholars and practitioners from across the
energy sector and highlight the role that these justice risks play in energy project devel-
opment. For example, if project risk is not allocated to a project stakeholder prior to
the development of a project, then it will not happen. This is a reason why carbon
capture and storage has not yet happened in many countries: because between govern-
ments, companies and the public there has been no agreement of liability for the risk.
The result of identifying insurmountable project risk results is major asset devaluation;
that is a major worry across the energy sector and this is what COVID-19 may accelerate.
Witness, for example, one recent example where BP conducted a major revaluation and
announced that they have written off £17.5 billion in assets from their balance sheet.117
Increasingly, as identified in Section 4 where the 12 justice risks are detailed, these
will be considered even greater risks post COVID-19. The demands for a sustainable
recovery are growing, supported by the same major movements across society that
push for an inclusive energy transition. Many countries are already adopting policy
goals that aim to meet the UN SDGs, and these have instilled visions of societies
that are more inclusive. COVID-19 has placed societies on hold, economic growth
and development have slowed, and there is a push for a better world where develop-
ment aims to be more inclusive. The 12 justice risks are an example of how this has
materialised and is materialising in the energy sector, in particular around project
development – with the 12 risks being economics; taxation; project finance; bank-
ruptcy; disclosure and transparency; insurance; environmental impact assessments;
climate change action; rules of foreign investment; the 2015 Paris Agreement; rise
in technology – data and images; and the UN SDGs.
The changes in risk that we identify have resulted from a triad of issues: a health
crisis (a pandemic), a financial recession (resulting from the pandemic and continuing
from the economic crisis of 2007–2009), and an ongoing energy transition (that is
largely technology driven). These risks aim to deliver a more inclusive and just
society (ie with characteristics of fairness, equity and equality). A realignment of
the energy mix of different countries will happen, and it will enforce change across
the energy sector. It is proposed here that new energy projects in a more risk-conser-
vative world post COVID-19, and in the midst of a financial crisis, will have to
contend with a clear and new set of justice risks that will determine (a) whether a
project will proceed in planning; (b) whether it will receive permission; and (c)
what the necessary standards and requirements will be that the project has to meet.
The world of risk management in energy project development is set to change fast,
and new data and knowledge will be needed as the energy transition accelerates to be
117 Financial Times (n 72).
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more just, equitable and inclusive post COVID-19. The pandemic has advanced the
perfect storm of issues that put justice and – as put forward here specifically
– justice risks at the forefront of new project risk in the energy sector worldwide.
ORCID
Raphael Heffron http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3026-9604
30 R Heffron et al.
